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A.		Introduction
1		There	are	few	legal	concepts	which	polarize	so	many	different	and,	sometimes,	antagonist	connotations	than	that	of	‘Sanction’,	a	notion
which,	at	the	same	time	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	determination	of	the	nature	of	an	order	as	legal	or	not.	In	effect,	many	writers	consider
sanctions	to	be	the	very	criterion	for	the	identification	of	a	legal	(compared	to	a	non-legal)	order	(see	Kelsen	[1953]	13–17;	see	also	Laquièze,
at	1381)	or,	at	least,	as	the	condition	for	its	effectiveness.	In	this	Kelsenian	(or	Kelsen-inspired)	conception,	the	legal	order	is	characterized
by	the	fact	that	rules	are	backed	up	by	acts	of	constraint	which	come	into	play	in	case	of	their	violation;	this	specificity	would	actually
distinguish	the	legal	order	from	other	types	of	normative	orders:	‘Law	is,	by	its	very	nature,	a	coercive	order.	A	coercive	order	is	a	system	of
rules	prescribing	certain	patterns	of	behaviour	by	providing	coercive	measures,	as	sanctions,	to	be	taken	in	case	of	a	contrary	behaviour,	or,
what	amounts	to	the	same,	in	case	of	violation	of	the	law’	(Kelsen	[1951]	706).
2		However,	such	a	conception	of	the	legal	order	could	eventually	cast	doubt	on	the	legal	character	of	the	international	order,	traditionally
considered	as	lacking	a	systemic	arsenal	of	sanctions	to	ensure	→	compliance	with	its	rules.	As	Hart	explained,	‘[t]his	theory	…	identifies
‘having	an	obligation’	or	‘being	bound’	with	‘likely	to	suffer	the	sanction	or	punishment	threatened	for	disobedience’.	Yet	…	this	identification
distorts	the	role	played	in	all	legal	thought	and	discourse	of	the	ideas	of	obligation	and	duty’	(Hart	217–218).
3		This	Hartian	way	of	thinking	is	nowadays	preponderant	and	the	legal	character	of	the	international	order	is	no	longer	disputed	on	the
ground	that	it	lacks	a	system	of	sanctions.	The	quarrel	on	the	role	of	sanctions	in	the	identification	of	an	authentic	legal	order	has	nonetheless
left	traces	in	the	international	discourse.	These	traces	are	visible	in	the	originally	broad	meaning	of	sanctions	that	the	legal	writers	conveyed
in	order	to	demonstrate	and	assure	the	legal	character	of	the	international	order.
B.		Criteria	for	the	Identification	of	Sanctions
4		Thus,	the	concept	of	sanctions	was	(and	still	sometimes	is)	defined	as	encompassing	all	the	mechanisms	of	enforcement,	functioning	as
guarantees	for	compliance	with	the	→	rule	of	law	(Romano	15–16).	In	this	broad	acceptation	the	word	‘sanctions’	designates	all	types	of
consequences	triggered	by	the	violation	of	an	international	legal	rule.	These	consequences	range	from	a	series	of	soft,	unstructured	social
reactions,	such	as	pressures	from	→	public	opinion,	and	name-and-shame	politics	(Damrosch	19–20;	see	also	→	Mass	Media,	Influence	on
International	Relations),	to	a	variety	of	organized	effects	attached	to	the	non-respect	of	a	legal	rule.	The	latter	category	includes	non-coercive
consequences	such	as	→	nullity	in	International	Law	of	the	act	that	does	not	respect	the	conditions	for	its	validity	(Austin	457;	see	also
Virally	221;	contra	Hart	33–34),	the	exceptio	non	adimpleti	contractus	principle	or	the	mechanism	of	→	State	responsibility,	as	well	as
coercive	measures,	with	some	involving	the	use	of	force	(→	Reprisals,	→	Self-defence),	and	some	not	(→	Boycott,	→	Retorsion).
5		Such	a	broad	understanding	hardly	copes	with	either	the	Kelsenian	or	the	Hartian	conceptions	of	sanctions,	which	rest	upon	the
persuasive	force	of	→	coercion	to	bring	the	targeted	State	(or	other	international	law	subject)	back	to	legality.	Indeed,	the	legal	discourse	has
gradually	come	to	reserve	the	use	of	the	term	‘sanctions’	to	the	measures	of	constraint	taken	either	by	States	or	by	international
organizations	in	order	to	restore	the	international	legality,	broken	by	the	illicit	act	of	an	international	legal	subject.	Such	a	view	was
predominant	until	the	1990s	(see	Dupuy).
6		It	must	be	noted	that	such	an	understanding	includes,	under	the	heading	of	‘sanctions’,	measures	of	self-help	taken	individually	by	the
injured	State	(or	international	organization)	to	ensure	compliance	with	the	obligations	owed	to	it	by	another	subject	(unilateral	sanctions),	as
well	as	the	institutional	decisions	of	international	organizations	meant	to	restore	the	international	legality,	in	cases	where	the	sanctioning
entity	suffered	no	direct	injury	(multilateral	sanctions).	The	distinction	between	the	two	categories	is	nonetheless	fundamental:	whereas	the
unilateral	measures	taken	by	the	injured	entity	disclose	a	form	of	private	justice	(see	Alland	[1994]	24–26	in	particular),	the	latter	reveal	a
form	of	recognition	of	the	existence	of	an	international	community	and	of	centralization	or	institutionalization	of	the	international	society,	with
the	international	organization	playing	the	role	of	guardian	of	the	global	legality.
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7		It	is,	however,	not	surprising	that	in	a	rather	primitive	legal	order	such	as	public	international	law,	with	no	centralized	institutions	to
establish	the	violation	of	rules	and	to	ensure	their	enforcement,	this	double	function	is	mainly	incumbent	upon	States.	As	a	consequence,	it	is
sustained	that	any	unilateral	coercive	measure	taken	in	reaction	to	an	unlawful	act	may	be	called	‘sanction’	(Salmon	1017).	This	broad
definition	includes	both	what	is	now	commonly	referred	to	as	‘counter-measures’	and	afflictive	acts	decided	by	an	entity	or	institution	acting
in	the	name	of	the	international	community	and	in	the	interest	of	this	community	as	a	whole.
8		Such	an	approach	is	not	without	difficulty:	not	only	does	it	cover	two	very	different	phenomena,	it	also	seems	to	limit	the	scope	of
sanctions	to	coercive	acts	meant	to	re-establish	international	legality	while,	in	the	contemporary	world,	the	main	purpose	of	centralized
sanctions	is	the	preservation	or	re-establishment	of	international	peace	and	security.	For	the	sake	of	clarity	it	seems	therefore	more
appropriate	and	operational	to	define	sanctions	as	socially	organized	acts	of	constraint.	Thus	Abi-Saab	(at	35)	defines	‘sanctions’	as
‘[c]oercive	measures	taken	in	execution	of	a	decision	of	a	competent	social	organ,	iean	organ	legally	empowered	to	act	in	the	name	of	the
society	or	community	that	is	governed	by	the	legal	system’.	In	such	a	conception,	‘sanctions’	involve	three	cumulative	characteristics:	they
are	coercive	(constraint)	measures;	they	bear	an	afflictive	dimension;	and	they	are	based	upon	a	collective	decision.	Excluded	from	the
scope	of	such	a	definition	are	both	non-coercive	measures	(the	purely	legal	sanctions	such	as	the	nullity	of	an	act,	or	the	soft	mechanisms	of
condemnation	by	public	opinion)	and	unilateral	measures	taken	by	States	or	international	organizations	as	a	reply	for	a	breach	of	their	rights
which	constitute	counter-measures.	This	evolution	is	reflected	in	the	drafting	history	of	Art.	22	of	the	ILC	Articles	on	Responsibility	of	States
for	Internationally	Wrongful	Acts	(‘ILC	Articles’)	now	entitled	‘Countermeasures	in	Respect	of	an	Internationally	Wrongful	Act’,	which
originates	from	a	draft	article	proposed	by	Roberto	Ago	in	1962	entitled	‘Legitimate	Application	of	a	Sanction’	(ILC	Yearbook	vol	II	Part	I	47
para.	99).	In	doing	so,	the	Commission	made	an	allowance:
for	the	trend	in	modern	international	law	to	reserve	the	term	‘sanction’	for	reactive	measures	applied	by	virtue	of	a	decision	taken
by	an	international	organization	following	a	breach	of	an	international	obligation	having	serious	consequences	for	the	international
community	as	a	whole,	and	in	particular	for	certain	measures	which	the	United	Nations	is	empowered	to	adopt,	under	the	system
established	by	the	Charter,	with	a	view	to	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security	(ibid	Art.	30,	Commentary,	121
para.	21).
9		At	the	heart	of	the	strict	conception,	which	prevails	in	today’s	practice,	lies	the	postulate	that	the	international	society	has	an	organ
competent	first,	to	objectively	establish	the	violation	of	a	legal	rule,	and	second	to	impose	the	coercive	measures	meant	to	constrain	the
targeted	entity	to	restore	the	legality.	‘This	is	because	such	a	decision	must	be	based	on	“finding”	and	not	a	mere	“contention”	or	“allegation”
resulting	from	the	“self-interpretation”	of	the	situation	by	the	other	party.	Moreover,	this	“determination”	must	be	accompanied	by	a	“decision”,
ordering	or	recommending	the	measures	to	be	taken	on	the	basis	of	this	finding’	(Abi-Saab	39;	see	also	Picchio-Forlati	and	Sicilianos	[2004]
21).
10		The	evolution	of	the	legal	discourse	in	this	direction,	mirroring	that	of	the	practice,	is	remarkable	and	the	refinement	of	the	concept	of
‘sanctions’	noticeable:	though	the	term	might	still	occasionally	designate	the	unilateral	reactions	of	enforcement	of	the	system	of
responsibility	by	an	injured	State,	it	is	nonetheless	used	more	and	more	to	designate	the	sanctions	imposed	or	mandated	by	competent
international	organizations.	The	good	fortune	of	the	notion	of	countermeasures,	a	concept	designed	to	cover	the	first	category	of	enforcement
measures,	partially	explains	this	terminological	evolution.
11		The	other	explanation	is	linked	to	the	reawakening	of	the	Security	Council	in	the	1990’s	(→	United	Nations,	Security	Council),	its
abundant	practice	since	then	giving	concrete	expression	to	something	that,	for	a	long	time,	was	only	seen	as	a	potentiality	provided	for	by	the
→	United	Nations	Charter.	This	evolution	has	accredited	the	idea	that	the	international	legal	system	is	endowed	with	a	mechanism	of
centralized	sanctions,	since	the	United	Nations	is	the	only	organization	whose	membership	and	competences	are	large	enough	to	represent
the	international	society	as	a	whole,	and	the	Security	Council	enjoys	the	power	to	decide	and	to	enforce	its	decisions.	However,	this
institutionalized	mechanism	remains	unpredictable,	so	that,	in	parallel	with	the	development	of	measures	decided	by	the	Security	Council
and,	marginally,	some	other	international	organizations,	‘third-party	countermeasures’,	‘that	is	to	say,	peaceful	unilateral	coercive	measures
adopted	by	a	non-directly	injured	State	in	defence	of	the	public	interest	and	not	otherwise	justified	under	international	law’	(Dawidowicz	333),
have	flourished	on	the	margins	of	the	law.
C.		UN	Security	Council	Sanctions	under	Chapter	VII	of	the	UN	Charter
12		The	origins	of	the	mechanism	established	under	Chapter	VII	of	the	Charter	can	be	found	in	Art.	16	Covenant	of	the	→	League	of	Nations,
the	first	paragraph	of	which	reads	as	follows:
Should	any	Member	of	the	League	resort	to	war	in	disregard	of	its	covenants	under	Articles	12,	13	or	15,	it	shall	ipso	facto	be
deemed	to	have	committed	an	act	of	war	against	all	other	Members	of	the	League,	which	hereby	undertake	immediately	to	subject
it	to	the	severance	of	all	trade	or	financial	relations,	the	prohibition	of	all	intercourse	between	their	nationals	and	the	nationals	of
the	covenant-breaking	State,	and	the	prevention	of	all	financial,	commercial	or	personal	intercourse	between	the	nationals	of	the
covenant-breaking	State	and	the	nationals	of	any	other	State,	whether	a	Member	of	the	League	or	not.
13		The	Covenant	was	thus	empowering	Member	States	to	react	to	a	breach	of	peace	in	violation	of	its	provisions	through	a	series	of
measures,	some	of	which	involved	the	use	of	force.	However,	States	remained	free	to	determine	whether	any	such	violation	had	occurred.
14		Chapter	VII	of	the	UN	Charter	is,	in	a	sense,	the	improved	legacy	of	Art.	16	of	the	Covenant:	both	mechanisms	rest	upon	the	idea	of
→	collective	security	as	a	substitute	for	unilateral	measures	of	self-defence.	However,	in	contrast	with	the	Covenant,	the	Charter	endows	a
central	organ	first	to	establish	the	existence	of	a	threat	to,	or	a	breach	of,	the	peace	(Art.	39),	and	then	to	decide	the	measures	to	be	taken	(cf
Arts	41	and	42)	to	insure	or	restore	it.
1.		The	Triggering	of	Chapter	VII	Sanctions
15		Chapter	VII	opens	with	Art.	39,	by	virtue	of	which	‘[t]he	Security	Council	shall	determine	the	existence	of	any	threat	to	the	peace,	breach
of	the	peace,	or	act	of	aggression	and	shall	make	recommendations,	or	decide	what	measures	shall	be	taken	in	accordance	with	Articles	41
and	42,	to	maintain	or	restore	international	peace	and	security’	(→	Peace,	Threat	to;	→	Peace,	Breach	of;	→	Aggression).	It	is	thus
remarkable	that	Chapter	VII,	or	generally	the	Charter,	only	envisaged	sanctions	against	a	State	threatening	or	breaching	the	peace—not	upon
the	violator	of	international	law	as	such.	As	Kelsen	put	it:	‘The	purpose	of	the	enforcement	action	under	Article	39	is	not:	to	maintain	or
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restore	the	law,	but	to	maintain,	or	restore	peace,	which	is	not	necessarily	identical	with	the	law’	(Kelsen	[1951]	294;	see	also	Bennouna	27).
It	is	therefore	apparent	that	the	Security	Council	‘is	not	specifically	authorized	to	adjudicate	on	wrongful	conduct	and	to	respond	to	it	in	its
character	as	such’	(Crawford	in	Gowlland–Debbas	[ed]	[2001]	58).
16		However,	it	can	be	considered	that,	in	the	overwhelming	majority	of	cases,	a	threat	to	the	peace	or	a	breach	of	the	peace	will	result	from
a	breach	of	international	law	and	that,	in	any	case,	the	Security	Council,	when	determining	the	existence	of	a	threat	to,	or	a	breach	of,	the
peace,	creates	by	the	same	token	ad	hoc	obligations	for	the	targeted	entity	to	refrain	from	such	action.	The	sanctions	under	Arts	41	and	42
are	consecutive	to	the	violation	of	such	an	obligation	(see	Kelsen	[1951]	736)	and	are	meant	to	give	effect	to	its	action	under	Art.	39.	As
Combacaurightlyunderlined:
le	Conseil	de	sécurité	reconnaît	dans	un	acte	sur	lequel	la	Charte	ne	statue	pas	directement	l’élément	constitutif	d’une	situation
illégale	de	l’art.	39	et	prend	contre	son	auteur	les	mesures	prévues	par	les	art.	41	et	suivants;	le	chapitre	VII	ne	l’investit	d’aucun
‘rôle	législatif’	mais	d’une	fonction	normative	dérivée,	quasi-juridictionnelle	et	apparemment	rétroactive,	qui	consiste	à
concrétiser	l’obligation,	imprécise	mais	incluse	dans	la	Charte,	de	s’abstenir	de	tout	acte	constitutif	d’une	menace	pour	la	paix	ou
d’une	rupture	de	la	paix,	et	de	tout	acte	d’agression:
[The	Security	Council	acknowledges	that	an	act	not	directly	qualified	under	the	Charter	is	the	constitutive	element	of	an	illegal
situation	falling	under	Art.	39	and	takes	against	its	author	the	measures	provided	for	by	Art.	41	et	sequitur;	chapter	VII	does	not
entrust	it	with	any	‘legislative’	role,	but	it	does	grant	it	a	secondary	normative	function,	quasi-jurisdictional	and	apparently
retroactive,	consisting	for	the	Council	to	score	the	obligation,	imprecise	but	nonetheless	included	in	the	Charter,	to	abstain	from
any	act	constituting	a	threat	to,	or	a	breach	of	the	peace,	and	from	any	act	of	aggression]	(Combacau	16	[footnotes	omitted];	see
also	ibid	86–92	and	104–106).
17		The	practice	of	the	Security	Council	confirms	that,	in	most	cases,	the	characterization	of	a	situation	as	a	threat	to	the	peace	is	triggered
by	a	violation	of	international	law,	so	serious	that	the	Security	Council	considers	that	it	amounts	to	a	threat	to,	or	even	a	breach	of	the	peace.
This	is	so	a	fortiori	for	the	measures	decided	as	a	reply	to	an	act	of	aggression	which	is	always	unlawful	by	and	in	itself.	In	this	respect,	the
dichotomy	between	peace	and	law	proves	misleading,	the	two	being	in	large	part	interdependent	(contra:	d’Argent;	d’Aspremont;	Dopagne;
van	Steenberghe	in	Cot,	Pellet	and	Forteau	[eds]	1137).
18		Moreover,	a	synthesis	of	the	two	conceptions	is	possible	if	one	accepts	that	the	Council	is:
une	sorte	de	promoteur	universel	de	l’ordre	public,	au	double	sens	du	terme:	celui	de	la	sécurité	collective,	mais	également	celui
des	valeurs	et	principes	d’ordre	public,	au	sens	où	l’on	désigne	par	là	les	règles	fondamentales	hors	du	respect	desquelles	il	ne
saurait	y	avoir	de	vie	collective	dans	une	société	ordonnée
[a	sort	of	universal	promoter	of	the	public	order,	in	the	two	senses	of	the	word:	that	of	collective	security	and	that	of	principles	of
public	order,	meaning	the	fundamental	rules	without	whose	respect	there	cannot	be	social	life	in	an	ordered	society]	(Dupuy	in
Gowlland-Debbas	[ed]	48).
19		Quite	often,	the	Security	Council	identifies	breaches	of	international	law	which	call	for	enforcement	measures,	whether	in	a	previous
resolution	to	that	imposing	sanctions	(UNSC	Res	1696	[2006]	concerning	the	situation	in	Iran	specifying	the	obligations	imposed	upon	Iran,
and	UNSC	Res	1736	[2006]	imposing	sanctions	under	Art.	41),	or	in	the	preamble	of	the	same	resolution	(UNSC	Res	1970	[2011]	concerning
the	situation	in	Libya)	or	both	(UNSC	Res	1547	[2004]	concerning	the	situation	in	→	Sudan	makes	general	references	to	human	rights	and
humanitarian	law	violations,	whereas	UNSC	Res	1556	[2004]	makes	them	more	explicit	and	establishes	a	sanctions	regime).	Sanctions	thus
become,	beyond	any	doubt,	a	form	of	law	enforcement.
20		This	is	all	the	more	so	since	the	notions	of	threats	to,	or	breaches	of,	the	peace	in	Art.	39	are	polysemous:	they	were	used	by	the
Security	Council	to	cover:
–		inter-State	conflicts	(→	Korea:	UNSC	Res	82,	83,	84	[1950];	→	Falkland	Islands/Islas	Malvinas:	UNSC	Res	502	[1982];
→	Iran-Iraq	War	[1980–88]:	UNSC	Res	598	[1987],	→	Iraq-Kuwait	War	[1990–91]:	UNSC	Res	660	[1990];	the	Eritrea–Ethiopia
conflict:	UNSC	Res	1640	[2005];	the	Eritrea–Somalia	conflict:	UNSC	Res	1907	[2009]	and	2002	[2011];	→	Eritrea);
–		internal	conflicts	(→	Somalia,	Conflict:	UNSC	Res	794	[1992],	1425	[2002],	1519	[2003],1587	[2005],	1844	[2008],	1972	[2011];
Sudan:	UNSC	Res	1556	[2004],	1591	[2005],	1679	[2006];	→	Côte	d’Ivoire:	UNSC	Res	1572	[2004],	1643	[2005],	1727	[2006],	1782
[2007],	1842	[2008],	1893	[2009],	1946	[2010],	1975	[2011],	1980	[2011];	Mali:	UNSC	Res	2085	[2012]);
–		breach	of	the	principle	of	democracy	and	of	the	constitutional	order	(→	Haiti,	Conflict:	UNSC	Res	940	[1994];	→	Sierra	Leone:
UNSC	Res	1132	[1997]);
–		human	rights	or	humanitarian	law	violations	(→	Burundi:	UNSC	Res	1577	[2004];	Côte	d’Ivoire:	UNSC	Res	1633	[2005];	Libya:
UNSC	Res	1970	[2011]);
–		→	terrorism	(UNSC	Res	1267	[1999],	1373	[2001],	1390	[2002],	1735	[2006],	1822	[2008],	1904	[2009],	1989	[2011],	2082	[2012],
2083	[2012]);
–		→	piracy	(UNSC	Res	1816	[2008],	1976	[2011])
–	proliferation	of	nuclear,	chemical	and	biological	weapons	(UNSC	Res	825	[1993],	1540	[2004],	1695	[2006],	1718	[2006],	1887
[2009],	2087	[2013],	2094	[2013]).
21		The	enlargement	of	the	notion	of	a	threat	to	the	peace	is	evidenced	in	the	shift	in	the	notion	of	security	as	encompassed	by	the	Charter.
As	Gowlland-Debbas	noticed,	‘[t]he	move	from	a	State-oriented	to	a	more	individually-oriented	international	legal	system	has	meant	that	the
term	security	referred	to	in	Article	1(1)	can	no	longer	be	confined	but	must	ultimately	be	destinated	to	the	protection	of	individuals.	The
various	reports	and	declarations	on	UN	reform	are	replete	with	references	to	‘human	security’	alongside	state	security,	even	though	the
former	is	not	an	entirely	new	concept,	nor	has	it	been	defined	….	The	concept	of	human	security	has	been	reflected	in	the	use	of	Chapter	VII
measures	for	the	protection	of	populations	as	opposed	simply	to	the	protection	of	States,	emphasizing	individual	rights	and	human	dignity’
(Gowlland-Debbas	[2007]	262).	This	shift	entailed	that	the	sanctions	mechanisms	of	Chapter	VII	can	be	used	not	only	in	case	of	a	breach	of
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State-oriented	obligations,	but	equally	of	individually-oriented	rights.	Thus	the	area	of	legal	rules	protected	by	the	Security	Council
enforcement	measures	has	widened.
22		The	elasticity	of	the	notion	of	a	threat	to,	or	breach	of,	the	peace	was	accompanied	by	an	enlargement	of	the	category	of	targeted	entities;
as	a	consequence,	it	is	no	longer	necessary	that	a	violation	of	international	law	amounting	to	a	threat	to	the	peace	be	attributable	to	a	State	in
order	to	justify	the	imposition	of	sanctions.	Individuals	or	groups	can	violate	international	law	and	be	subject	to	sanctions.
23		When	a	violation	is	found	to	be	the	basis	of	Security	Council	sanctions,	this	entails,	as	a	corollary,	that	the	ultimate	goal	of	such
sanctions	is	the	restoration	of	the	international	legality;	‘[l]a	sanction	a	donc	pour	fonction	de	faire	pression	sur	le	destinataire	pour	l’amener	à
se	conformer	à	la	légalité	internationale,	telle	qu’elle	ressort	des	décisions	du	Conseil	de	sécurité’	[(t)he	function	of	the	sanction	is	therefore
to	exert	a	pressure	on	the	addressee	to	induce	it	to	comply	with	the	international	legality,	stemming	from	the	decisions	of	the	Security
Council]	(Bennouna	19;	see	also	23).	Law-enforcement	is	therefore	the	most	frequent	finality	of	Chapter	VII	sanctions	(Combacau	23–24;	see
also	Abi-Saab	67;	Bennouna	24;	Sicilianos	[2004]	15).	This	implies	that	sanctions	must	also	be	reversible––once	the	return	to	legality	is
obtained,	sanctions	must	be	lifted:	‘Coercition	et	réversibilité	constituent,	en	réalité,	les	deux	faces	de	la	médaille’	[Coercion	and	reversibility
are	the	two	sides	of	the	same	coin]	(Sicilianos	ibid).
24		On	the	other	hand,	while	sanctions	are	necessarily	afflictive	since	they	restrict	the	rights	of	the	targeted	entity,	they	are	not	necessarily
punitive	since,	under	the	cover	of	a	threat	to	the	peace,	they	may	anticipate	a	violation	not	yet	committed.	On	this	basis,	UN	organs	insist	that
measures	under	Chapter	VII	are	preventive	and	not	punitive	(Third	Report	of	the	Analytical	Support	and	Sanctions	Monitoring	Team
Appointed	pursuant	to	Resolution	1526	[2004]	concerning	Al	Qaeda	and	the	→	Taliban	and	associated	individuals	and	entities	paras	39–41;
see	also	Joined	Cases	C‑584/10	P,	C‑593/10	P	and	C‑595/10	P	European	Commission,	Council	of	the	European	Union,	United	Kingdom	of
Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	v	Yassin	Abdullah	Kadi	(Opinion	of	Advocate	General	Bot)	[2013]	para.	68).
25		However,	the	Chapter	VII	mechanism	is	highly	contingent:	not	all	gross	violations	of	fundamental	principles	of	international	law	trigger	it;
it	can	be	triggered	for	other	reasons;	and	even	when	it	is	activated,	it	can	be	paralyzed	by	a	→	veto	from	one	of	the	five	permanent	members
or	the	lack	of	a	majority	of	nine	out	of	15	votes.	It	can	therefore	not	be	the	exclusive	means	of	law	enforcement	in	the	international	legal	order
and	it	must	necessarily	coexist	with	other	forms	of	sanctions	(lato	sensu),	such	as	countermeasures.
2.		Evolution	of	the	Practice	of	Sanctions
26		Until	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	wall,	recourse	to	sanctions	under	Chapter	VII	of	the	Charter	was	scarce	and	unorthodox.	Within	the	framework
of	the	→	Cold	War	(1947–91),	the	Council	was	largely	paralyzed	by	the	veto	and	could	only	decide	upon	sanctions	in	situations	where	none	of
the	‘Big	Five’	(and	first	of	all	the	United	States	and	the	USSR)	or	their	protégés	were	involved.
27		On	several	occasions	when	the	Security	Council	qualified	a	particular	situation	as	a	breach	of	the	peace	(Palestine,	Iran-Iraq	war,
Falkland	Islands),	such	qualification	was	not	followed	by	the	imposition	of	sanctions.	Only	on	two	occasions	did	the	Security	Council
overstep	the	veto	obstacle	and	impose	mandatory	→	economic	sanctions:	Southern	→	Rhodesia/Zimbabwe	(for	breach	of	the	right	to	→	self-
determination	of	the	African	majority	see	UNSC	Res	232	[1966],	253	[1968],	277	[1970],	333	[1973],	388	[1976]	using	the	quasi-
comprehensive	panoply	of	Art.	41	measures)	and	South	Africa	(in	an	attempt	to	put	an	end	to	the	→	apartheid	system,	an	arms	embargo	was
established	by	UNSC	Res	418	[1977],	and	was	reinforced	by	UNSC	Res	558	[1984]).	However,	in	the	latter	case,	all	subsequent	efforts	to
impose	comprehensive	economic	sanctions	were	defeated,	despite	the	UN	General	Assembly’s	recommendations	(UNGA	Res	1899
[XVIII]).	As	for	the	military	measures,	the	very	special	circumstances	in	which	they	could	be	decided	concerning	Korea	(absence	of	the
USSR	from	the	Council,	see	UNSC	Res	82	[1950])	have	never	occurred	again.
28		The	situation	radically	changed	in	1990	and,	at	least	between	that	year	and	1994,	the	whole	array	of	sanctions	envisaged	in	Arts	41	and
42	Charter	were	resorted	to.	In	spite	of	a	marked	slowing	down	of	this	trend	since	then,	sanctions	under	Chapter	VII	are	now	in	common
usage.	But	it	can	be	noted	that,	during	the	two	‘sanctions	decades’,	the	UN	Security	Council’s	practice	of	sanctions	went	through	a	double
process	of	refinement:	ratione	materiae,	their	scope	was	reduced	to	a	series	of	specific	economic	or	political	measures;	and	ratione
personae,	the	Security	Council	nominally	identified	the	targets	of	these	measures	or	created	a	UN	centralized	procedure	for	such
identification.
(a)		From	Global	to	Smart	Sanctions
29		Chapter	VII	envisages	two	categories	of	enforcement	measures:	Art.	41	covers	measures	‘not	involving	the	use	of	armed	force’,	while
Art.	42	authorizes	the	Security	Council	to	use	the	coercive	military	force	‘to	maintain	or	restore	international	peace	and	security’.	A	difference
of	paramount	importance	separates	the	two	mechanisms:	whereas	the	economic	sanctions	of	Art.	41	are	intended	to	coexist	with	similar
unilateral	measures	taken	by	States	(or	other	international	organizations),	the	measures	of	Art.	42	come	within	the	exclusive	competence	of
the	Security	Council.	They	are	a	substitute	for	the	unilateral	use	of	force.	However,	failing	the	conclusion	of	the	agreements	provided	for	in
Art.	43,	the	action	of	the	Council	under	Art.	42	is	conditioned	by	the	availability	of	‘forces	of	Members	of	the	United	Nations’.
30		The	Security	Council	has	nonetheless	authorized	on	a	number	of	occasions,	through	a	particularly	laconic	formula,	the	use	of	armed
force	by	Member	States:	‘Authorize[d]	[Member	States]	…	to	take	all	necessary	measures’	(UNSC	Res	678	[1990]	after	the	invasion	of
Kuwait	by	Iraq,	UNSC	Res	794	[1992]);	allowed	intervention	in	Somalia	(UNSC	Res	940	[1994]);	protected	civilians	under	imminent	threat	of
physical	violence	in	Côte	d’Ivoire	(UNSC	1609	[2005]);	and	protected	civilians	and	civilian	populated	areas	under	threat	of	attack	in	Libya
(UNSC	1973	[2011]).	The	same	formula	is	used	for	establishing	the	right	of	peace-keeping	forces	to	use	force	(UNSC	Res	1546	[2004])	for
the	coalition	forces	in	Iraq	(for	the	interpretation	of	this	resolution,	see	→	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	[ECtHR]	Case	27021/08	Al-Jedda
v	United	Kingdom	[7	July	2011]	[passim];	UNSC	Res	1551	[2004],	for	the	forces	in	→	Bosnia-Herzegovina;	or	UNSC	Res	1563	[2004]	for	the
multilateral	forces	in	Afghanistan,	1672	[2006];	→	Afghanistan,	Conflict;	see	also	the	examples	provided	in	the	Repertoire	of	the	Practice	of
the	Security	Council,	under	Art.	42).
31		Whether	authorizations	for	the	use	of	force	fall	within	the	ambit	of	Art.	42	is	still	debated.	The	Security	Council	has	never	formally
invoked	this	article,	and	the	relevant	decisions	simply	make	a	general	reference	to	Chapter	VII.	The	question	also	arises	whether	the
measures	taken	by	States	in	application	of	these	decisions	can	qualify	as	sanctions.	Since	the	Security	Council	did	not	decide	upon	the
specific	measures	to	be	taken,	this	is	at	best	a	hybrid	form	of	sanctions	(or	another	substitute	for	institutionalized	sanctions),	based	upon	a
collective	finding	of	a	threat	to,	or	breach	of,	the	peace,	but	without	necessarily	entailing	collective	measures	properly	said.	In	any	case,
States	incur	full	responsibility	for	acts	taken	under	the	empire	of	such	an	authorization	if	they	amount	to	a	violation	of	their	international
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obligations	(ECtHR	Case	27021/08	Al-Jedda	v	United	Kingdom	and	Case	55721/07	Al-Skeini	v	United	Kingdom).
32		The	end	of	the	Cold	War	permitted	a	prompt	reaction	of	the	Security	Council	against	the	invasion	of	Kuwait	by	Iraq.	Not	only	did	the
Security	Council	authorize	the	use	of	force	by	a	coalition	of	willing	countries	(UNSC	Res	687	[1990]),	but	it	also	immediately	imposed	a
comprehensive	economic	embargo	(UNSC	Res	661	and	670	[1990])	(see	Cortright	Lopez	and	Gerber-Stellingwerf	207–210).	A	similar	model
of	comprehensive	economic	sanctions	was	applied	in	the	context	of	the	dissolution	of	Yugoslavia	(→	Yugoslavia,	Dissolution	of)	and	the
subsequent	conflicts	(UNSC	Res	757	[1992],	further	strengthened	by	UNSC	Res	787	[1992]	and	820	[1993]),	after	the	unsuccessful	arms
embargo	imposed	by	UNSC	Res	713	(1991)	and	724	(1991)	and	of	the	coup	d’état	in	Haiti	(UNSC	Res	841	[1993]	and	917	[1994])	(for	a
detailed	analysis	see	Gowlland-Debbas	[2004]	6–11).
33		These	global	sanctions	ranged	from	a	quasi-general	trade	embargo	(in	the	case	of	Haiti	an	embargo	was	only	imposed	for	oil	and	oil
products)	and	an	arms	embargo,	to	financial	sanctions	and	an	overreaching	ban	on	all	means	of	transportation.	Whereas	in	Rhodesia’s	case,
sanctions	were	strengthened	gradually,	stretching	out	over	several	years.	In	the	1990’s,	the	Security	Council	chose	to	apply	from	the	outset	a
large	spectrum	of	measures,	hoping	for	a	speedy	change	in	the	attitude	of	the	targeted	State’s	officials.	However,	these	sanctions	rapidly	had
serious	humanitarian	consequences	upon	the	population	of	the	State	(Reisman	and	Stevick	101–124;	as	for	Iraq,	see	also	the	1991	Report	on
Humanitarian	Needs	in	Iraq	in	the	Immediate	Post-crisis	Environment	by	a	Mission	to	the	Area	Led	by	M	Martti	Ahtisaari,	the	Under-
Secretary-General	for	Administration	and	Management).	As	Cortright	noted,	‘[t]he	record	of	Security	Council	sanctions	since	1990	is	one	of
striking	contrast,	if	not	contradictions.	As	the	Council	moved	forcefully	to	use	sanctions	as	a	means	for	advancing	the	UN	mandate	to
preserve	peace	and	security	…	it	found	that	the	outcomes	of	these	measures	were	undermining	other	dimensions	of	the	UN	agenda,
especially	the	goal	of	improving	the	human	condition’	(Cortright	Lopez	and	Gerber-Stellingwerf	207).
34		Despite	UN	efforts	to	address	these	humanitarian	consequences	(→	Oil	for	Food	Programme	or	humanitarian	exceptions	concerning
food	or	medical	materials,	provided	for	by	the	sanctioning	resolution),	support	for	economic	global	sanctions,	which	resembled	→	collective
punishment	rather	than	an	effective	pressure	capable	of	influencing	the	behaviour	of	leaders’,	seriously	weathered	out.	The	UN	responded	to
these	criticisms	by	modifying	the	scope	of	the	measures	decided:	after	the	sanctions	in	the	case	of	Haiti,	the	global	sanctions	were
abandoned	in	favour	of	more	targeted	sanctions.	Conceived	in	such	a	way	as	to	avoid	adverse	consequences	for	the	population,	the	targeted
(or	smart)	sanctions	were	considered	to	focus	upon	the	‘delinquent	rulers’	(Millennium	Report	para.	356).	These	kind	of	sanctions	included
financial	sanctions,	travel	bans,	arms	embargoes,	and	embargoes	on	specific	commodities	(eg	diamonds	in	the	cases	of	→	Angola,	UNSC
Res	1127	[1997]	and	Sierra	Leone,	UNSC	Res	1306	[2002]	in	order	to	cut	down	one	of	the	rebels’	sources	of	financing;	see	also	→	Kimberley
Process).
35		Consequently,	the	practice	of	sanctions	changed	from	State-oriented	to	individual-oriented	sanctions,	since	these	specific	measures,	by
their	nature,	could	only	be	applied	to	specific	targets.	There	was	thus	a	shift	from	the	prohibition	or	restriction	of	the	movement	of	funds	and
the	freezing	of	government	assets,	to	blocking	the	accounts	of	or	imposing	travel	bans	on	designated	entities	and	individuals.
(b)		The	Listing	System
36		As	early	as	1994	(UNSC	Res	917	[1994]	para.	3	concerning	the	military	officers	involved	in	the	coup	d’état	in	Haiti),	the	Security	Council
experienced	a	model	of	sanctions	based	on	listings	nominally	designating	individuals	(see	also	for	the	UNITA’s	leaders	and	their	families
UNSC	Res	1127	[1997]	para.	4	and	for	the	leading	members	of	the	military	junta	in	Sierra	Leone	UNSC	Res	1171	[1998]	para.	5).	However,	in
these	instances,	the	designated	individuals	were	apprehended	functionally,	as	members	of	a	government	or	of	a	political	faction	based	in	a
particular	State.	With	the	anti-terrorist	resolutions	(see,	inter	alia,	UNSC	Res	1390	[2002],	1452	[2002],	1455	[2003],	1526	[2004],	1617	[2005],
1735	[2006],	1904	[2009],	1989	[2011]	concerning	Al	Qaeda	and	associated	individuals	and	entities),	the	sanctions	regime	was	completely	de-
territorialized	and	the	link	between	the	sanctions’	target	and	a	given	State	was	broken.
37		Such	evolution	was	the	logical	outcome	given	threats	to	the	peace	not	only	in	territorial	crises,	but	also	in	global	phenomena	(terrorism,
proliferation	of	arms	of	mass	destruction).	Both	approaches	coexist	nowadays,	sometimes	in	the	framework	of	the	same	sanctions	regime:
thus,	the	sanctions	directed	to	stop	Iran	and	North	Korea’s	nuclear	programmes	consist	of	a	ban	on	a	series	of	items,	arms	embargo	and
targeted	sanctions	against	persons	involved	in	the	programme	(see	UNSC	Res	1737	[2006],	1929	[2010],	1984	[2011]	and	respectively	1718
[2006],	1874	[2009],	2087	[2013],	2094	[2013]).	By	Resolution	1540	(2004),	the	proliferation	of	→	weapons	of	mass	destruction	was	qualified
as	a	threat	to	the	peace	and	the	Council	imposed	upon	States	a	series	of	obligations	to	contain	the	risk	of	private	actors	coming	into
possession	of	them.	This	equally	presupposed	that	individuals	or	private	entities	were	actually	considered	→	subjects	of	international	law,
and	having	international	obligations,	which	they	could	breach	thus	incurring	the	risk	of	being	sanctioned	at	the	international	level.
38		In	directly	subjecting	private	persons	to	its	sanctions’	regimes,	the	Security	Council	pierces	the	State	(corporate)	veil	and	removes,	in	a
way,	these	targets	from	the	protection	of	their	national	legal	system.	However,	while	particular	attention	was	paid	to	the	most	effective	way	of
restricting	the	rights	of	the	persons	listed,	little	was	foreseen	in	terms	of	protecting	their	fundamental	rights.	Political	and	judicial	critics	led
the	Council	to	adapt	and	continuously	reform	the	listing	regime,	providing	for	a	series	of	guarantees	for	individual	rights	in	the	sanctions’
implementation	procedure.
(c)		Sanctions’	Implementation
39		The	proper	implementation	of	the	sanctions	regime	rests	first	upon	the	sanctions	committees	that	the	Security	Council	establish	as	its
subsidiary	bodies	when	it	decides	sanctions	under	Chapter	VII,	but	also	ultimately	upon	the	Member	States	or	the	regional	organizations	that
are	called	to	apply	these	measures	in	concreto.	This	multilevel	implementation	raises	difficult	questions	relating	to	the	relationship	between
the	United	Nations	and	the	national	(or	regional)	legal	order,	as	a	number	of	cases	amply	illustrate.
(i)		The	Role	and	Functioning	of	the	Sanctions	Committees
40		Quite	systematically,	when	establishing	a	sanctions’	regime,	the	Security	Council	creates	sanctions	committees	to	participate	in,	and
survey,	its	implementation	(in	March	2013,	13	were	still	functional	and	13	had	been	abrogated).	These	committees	are	entrusted	with	the
follow-up	of	the	application	of	sanctions	by	States	(an	obligation	of	reporting	was	occasionally	imposed	upon	States),	with	the	examination	of
requests	from	the	States	particularly	affected	by	the	sanctions	or	with	granting	derogations,	and	most	importantly	with	the	establishment	of
lists	of	targets,	their	revision	or	with	the	radiation	from	a	list.	By	endowing	these	committees	with	the	competence	to	decide	on	the	specific
targets,	the	Security	Council	delegated	to	them	a	form	of	secondary	normative	power	(see	Kolliopoulos	in	Picchio-Forlati	and	Sicilianos	[eds]
568).
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41		The	committees	are	as	much	political	organs	as	the	Security	Council	itself:	their	composition	mirrors	that	of	the	Council	(with	the	slight
difference	being	that	their	president	is	nominated	for	one	year,	whereas	the	Security	Council’s	presidency	lasts	for	six	months).	The	same
goes	for	their	deciding	procedure	(→	consensus).	They	are	entirely	dependent	on	the	Security	Council,	which	controls	their	decisions––in
particular,	if	‘consensus	…	cannot	be	reached,	the	matter	may	be	submitted	to	the	Security	Council’	(1267	Sanctions	Committee	Guidelines)
and	ends	their	mandate	as	soon	as	a	sanctions’	regime	is	lifted.
42		The	decision	procedure	has	nonetheless	progressively	taken	an	administrative	turn,	in	the	sense	that	it	is	submitted	to	a	number	of
directives	and	guidelines	meant	to	ensure	its	fairness.	Such	procedural	framing	has	gradually	been	provided	for	by	the	Security	Council	as	a
means	to	compensate	for	the	lack	of	judicial	control	over	the	listing.	Starting	in	2005,	a	number	of	resolutions	provided	for	procedural
safeguards	to	protect	the	rights	of	the	persons	listed	and	to	avoid	arbitrary	decisions	(see	UNSC	Res	1730	[2006],	1735	[2006],	1822	[2008],
1904	[2009],	1989	[2011]),	applicable	in	particular	to	the	most	far-reaching	sanctions	regime	adopted	until	now,	namely	the	one	concerning	Al
Qaeda	and	associated	individuals	and	entities	(the	‘1267	Committee’).
43		These	rules	provide	for	an	obligation	of	motivation	incumbent	upon	the	States	proposing	the	listing	(UNSC	Res	1617	[2005]),	in	order	to
enable	the	committee	to	decide	on	the	appropriateness	of	the	listing;	the	material	criteria	leading	to	listing	were	also	refined,	the	committees
are	obliged	to	publish	the	lists	on	their	websites	and	the	States	of	residence	of	the	listed	person	and	to	notify	the	listing	to	him	or	her;	the
principle	of	a	periodic	revision	of	listing	has	equally	been	laid	down	(UNSC	Res	1735	[2006]);	the	listed	person	can	indirectly	expose	his/her
case	to	the	committee,	by	seizing	the	Focal	Point,	a	bureau	established	by	UNSC	Res	1730	(2006)	to	receive	the	files	in	defence.	For	the
1267	regime,	the	Security	Council	went	a	step	further	towards	establishing	a	third-party	control	of	the	listing:	it	created	for	that	purpose	the
Office	of	the	Ombudsperson	(UNSC	Res	1904	[2009])	and	strengthened	its	role	two	years	later	(UNSC	Res	1989	[2011]).	Persons	or	entities
found	on	the	1267	Consolidated	List	can	submit	their	request	for	delisting	to	an	independent	and	impartial	Ombudsperson,	appointed	by	the
Secretary-General.	The	role	of	the	Ombudsperson	is	to	gather	information	and	entertain	a	dialogue	with	the	person	listed,	eventually	with	the
States	concerned,	and	to	make	a	report	and	a	recommendation	to	the	committee	on	the	request	for	delisting.	This	recommendation,	as	the
name	indicates,	is	not	binding;	however,	should	the	committee	not	follow	this	recommendation,	the	matter	can	be	referred	to	the	Security
Council.
(ii)		The	Role	of	the	National	and	Regional	Legal	Orders
44		The	addressees	of	the	sanctions	resolutions	are	always	the	States,	who	have	an	obligation	to	implement	them	in	their	national	legal
orders.	The	Security	Council	thus	uses	a	generic	formula	which	‘Decides	that	all	States	shall	take	the	measures	…’	The	Security	Council
thus	imposes	upon	States	the	need	to	take	the	domestic	measures	necessary	to	give	effect	to	its	resolutions.	This	confirms	that	international
law	is	dependent	upon	national	law	for	its	implementation.
45		This	raises	the	eternal	question	of	the	reception	by	States	of	international	legal	acts	and	of	the	relationship	between	international	and
domestic	legal	orders.	The	answer	to	that	question	is	provided	by	the	legal	order	of	reception,	namely	the	domestic	order,	and	cannot
therefore,	by	definition,	be	univocal.	Some	authors	consider	that	the	Security	Council’s	binding	resolutions	should	be	regarded	as	self-
executing	(Conforti	34–40),	but	in	practice	most	countries	assimilate	sanctions	decided	under	Chapter	VII	of	the	Charter	to	non-self-executing
treaty	obligations	(Gowlland-Debbas	[2004]	664;	see	also	Guillaume	546).	It	follows	that	a	domestic	act	will	interpose	itself	between	the
decision	imposing	sanctions	and	its	material	execution	by	national	entities.	Such	an	implementation	act	can	also	emanate	from	a	regional
organization;	this	is	the	case	of	the	European	Communities	then	Union,	whose	acts	are	self-executing	within	its	Member	States’	national
legal	orders	(see,	for	instance,	Regulation	No	881/2002,	the	annex	of	which	reproduces	the	names	of	the	persons	appearing	on	the	1267
Sanctions	Committee	Consolidated	List;	the	annexes	to	the	European	acts	are	amended	following	the	amendments	of	the	UN	listing;	see	also
the	European	Council	Regulation	No	204/2011	of	2	March	2011	implementing	the	sanctions	imposed	by	UNSC	Res	1970	[2011]	in	relation	to
the	situation	in	Libya).
46		Actually,	the	Security	Council’s	resolutions	are	rarely	specific	enough	to	be	considered	self-executing	(although,	throughout	the	years,
they	tend	to	be	more	and	more	definite:	compare	the	four	pages	length	of	UNSC	Res	1267	[1999]	instituting	the	1267	regime	with	the	eighteen
pages	length	of	UNSC	Res	1989	[2011],	the	last	in	date	regulating	it).	Moreover,	as	already	noted,	the	Council	addresses	States	and	not	the
economic	operators	amenable	to	execute	the	freezing	or	the	travel	ban.	However,	with	the	listing	regime,	the	Security	Council,	although	not
imposing	upon	States	specific	ways	to	comply	with	sanctions,	greatly	reduces	their	margin	of	appreciation,	since	they	can	determine	neither
the	material	nor	the	personal	scope	of	the	sanctions.	The	listings	are,	from	this	point	of	view,	individual	sanctions	that	impose	upon	States
pure	obligations	of	result.
47		The	intervention	of	the	national	legal	order	is	inescapable	for	the	establishment	of	penalties	for	the	violation	of	the	sanctions’	regimes,	an
aspect	scarcely	dealt	with	at	the	UN	level	(only	once	did	the	Security	Council	decide	sanctions	against	a	State	not	complying	with	previous
sanctions	imposed	upon	another	State—see	UNSC	Res	1343	[2001]	against	→	Liberia	for	its	violation	of	the	‘diamonds	embargo’	against
Sierra	Leone).	Once	the	Security	Council	has	established	a	sanctions	regime,	it	is	incumbent	upon	States	to	establish	the	penalties	for	lack
of	compliance.	Without	necessarily	expressing	this	in	mandatory	terms,	sanctions	resolutions	nonetheless	require	States	to	provide	for	a
system	of	‘second	degree’	sanctions:	‘calls	upon	States	to	bring	proceedings	against	persons	and	entities	within	their	jurisdiction	that	violate
the	measures	imposed	by	paragraph	4	above	and	to	impose	appropriate	penalties’	(UNSC	Res	1267	[1999]	para.	8).	Such	penalties	being	of
criminal	character,	the	intervention	of	the	domestic	order	is	imperative,	since,	in	principal,	international	organizations	are	incompetent	to
impose	criminal	sanctions	(except	for	the	international	criminal	courts	and	tribunals).	This	is	applicable	even	within	the	European	Union	(see
ECJ	[29	June	2010]	Case	C-550/09	Criminal	Proceedings	against	E,	F).	It	must,	however,	be	noted	that	it	can	happen	that	the	Security
Council	includes	among	the	sanctions	it	specifies	the	referral	to	the	Prosecutor	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	of	the	situation	at	stake
(see	UNSC	Res	1593	[2005]	concerning	Darfur	and	UNSC	Res	1970	[2011]	concerning	Libya).
48		Notwithstanding,	these	still	isolated	initiatives,	domestic	implementation	acts	are	necessary	in	order	to	ensure	the	best	efficiency	to	the
sanctions’	regime,	since	only	the	domestic	level	can	ultimately	enforce	sanctions.	Since	the	‘smart	sanctions’	impose	obligations	that	cannot
be	executed	without	the	participation	of	domestic	legal	subjects	(economic	stakeholders,	banks,	travel	companies),	domestic	acts	are	the
sole	efficient	means	to	make	them	comply	with	the	sanctions.	Efficiency,	understood	as	prompt	and	uniform	application,	is	also	one	of	the
reasons	why	implementation	through	the	European	Union	regulations	was	the	privileged	way	of	implementation	by	its	Member	States
(another	reason	being	that,	quite	usually,	the	sanctions	fall	within	the	exclusive	competence	of	the	EU).	Such	a	method	does	not,	however,
ensure	blind	compliance	with	the	sanctions,	since	the	implementing	acts	can	be	subject	to	the	control	of	domestic	(national	or	European)
judges	and	ultimately	annulled	by	them.
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(d)		Legality	of	Sanctions	and	Judicial	Control
49		In	consideration	of	their	adverse	impacts	upon	the	population	of	the	targeted	State	and	upon	the	human	rights	of	the	persons	listed,	the
sanctions	regime	raises	the	difficult	question	of	determining	the	obligations	binding	upon	the	Security	Council,	or	the	States	implementing	its
decisions,	when	acting	under	the	authority	of	Chapter	VII.	Since	that	Chapter	grants	the	Council	wide	discretionary	powers,	one	must
determine	first	whether	these	powers	are	unlimited;	in	case	of	negative	response,	the	source	of	the	obligations	imposing	the	limits	to	its
action	and	the	extent	of	these	obligations	must	be	identified.
50		It	is	nowadays	accepted	that	the	international	society	is	a	legal	community;	therefore,	the	Security	Council	must	be	bound	by	a	number
of	legal	rules.	As	the	→	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia	(ICTY)	Appeal	Chamber	put	it	in	the	→	Tadić	Case,
It	is	clear	…	that	the	Security	Council	plays	a	pivotal	role	and	exercises	a	very	wide	discretion	under	…	Article	[39].	But	this	does
not	mean	that	its	powers	are	unlimited.	The	Security	Council	is	an	organ	of	an	international	organization,	established	by	a	treaty
which	serves	as	a	constitutional	framework	for	that	organization.	The	Security	Council	is	thus	subjected	to	certain	constitutional
limitations,	however	broad	its	powers	under	the	constitution	may	be.	Those	powers	cannot,	in	any	case,	go	beyond	the	limits	of
the	jurisdiction	of	the	Organization	at	large,	not	to	mention	other	specific	limitations	or	those	which	may	derive	from	the	internal
division	of	power	within	the	Organization.	In	any	case,	neither	the	text	nor	the	spirit	of	the	Charter	conceives	of	the	Security
Council	as	legibus	solutus	(unbound	by	law)	(Tadić	[Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	Interlocutory	Appeal	on	Jurisdiction]	para.
28).
51		→	Ius	cogens	rules	no	doubt	impose	limitations	to	the	Security	Council’s	action	and	constitute	essential	parameters	to	assess	the
legality	of	its	resolutions	under	Chapter	VII.	The	obligations	deriving	from	these	rules	being	obligations	‘from	which	no	derogation	is
permitted’	(Art.	53	→	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	[1969]),	the	Security	Council	cannot	free	itself,	nor	liberate	the	Member
States,	from	applying	those	rules,	under	the	pretext	it	acts	under	Chapter	VII	of	the	Charter	and	a	resolution	contradicting	such	a	peremptory
norm	ought	to	be	considered	null	and	void	(for	a	judicial	decision	applying	this	reasoning	in	a	debatable	way	given	the	context	of	the	case,
see	General	Court	Case	T-315/01	Kadi	v	Council	and	Commission	paras	226–231;	→	Kadi	Case).	Similarly,	since	the	Security	Council
holds	its	competence	from	the	Charter,	any	resolution	which	would	not	comply	with	the	Charter	requirements,	either	formal	or	substantial,
should	be	held	invalid.
52		However,	while	there	is	no	reason	why	an	international	court	or	tribunal	could	not	check	the	legality	of	the	sanctions	against	these
principles,	it	can	be	accepted	that	domestic	courts	lack	the	power	to	exercise	direct	control	over	the	sanctions	resolutions,	with	a	view	to
annul	them.	However,	there	is	no	basis	to	exclude	judicial	control	of	the	Security	Council’s	sanctions,	under	the	form	of	an	exception
d’illégalité	(see	in	general	Pellet	[1995];	see	also	Bedjaoui	[1995]	255–97	and	[1994]	634).
53		Thus,	several	European	and	national	judicial	decisions	have	annulled	the	domestic	acts	implementing	sanctions	decided	by	the	Security
Council	for	lack	of	compliance	with	fundamental	rights	(ECJ	Joined	Cases	C–402/05	P	and	C–415/05	P	Kadi	and	Al	Barakaat	International
Foundation	v	Council	and	Commission	[2008];	General	Court	Case	T–85/09	Kadi	v	Commission	[2010]	T-85/09;	see	also	Nada	v	Switzerland
(ECtHR)	(Grand	Chamber)	App	10593/08	[2012];	for	a	series	of	challenges	before	the	national	jurisdictions	see	Candas	and	Miron).	If	the
domestic	judges	are	careful	to	underline	that	judicial	control	upon	the	implementing	acts	does	not	imply	control	over	the	resolutions
themselves,	and	do	not	engage	in	contesting	their	primacy	on	an	international	level,	by	virtue	of	Art.	103	UN	Charter	(Joined	Cases	C–402/05
P	and	C–415/05	P	Kadi	v	Council	paras	288–294),	these	annulments	bear	practical	consequences	at	the	UN	level.	While	it	is	true	that	they
leave	intact	the	validity	of	the	resolutions,	they	nonetheless	impair	their	efficiency,	which	is	dependent	upon	the	domestic	acts	of
implementation.	This	explains	why	the	Security	Council	is	engaged	in	a	continuous,	though	imperfect,	process	of	reform	of	the	listing
procedure.
54		However,	even	though	the	Security	Council	has	indeed	made	some	efforts	in	order	to	address	the	human	rights	concerns	in	the	context
of	the	global	sanctions,	the	listing	procedure	still	falls	short	of	providing	guarantees	with	respect	to	the	rights	to	property,	to	private	life,	to	the
rights	of	the	listed	person	to	be	informed	of	the	accusations	brought	against	him	or	her,	and	to	be	heard	and	judged	(see	Report	of	M	Scheinin,
Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms	while	Countering	Terrorism	[6	August
2010]).	Notably,	the	European	courts	wondered	whether	the	creation	of	the	Office	of	the	Ombudsperson	could	substitute	the	requirement	for
the	establishment	of	a	form	of	judicial	control	of	the	listings	(ECJ	Joined	Cases	C–402/05	P	and	C–415/05	P	Kadi	v	Council	para.	285	and
General	Court	Case	T–85/09	Kadi	v	Commission	para.	128).	In	the	Kadi	saga,	the	courts	seem	to	have	first	given	a	negative	answer.
However,	since	2010,	the	practice	of	the	first	Ombudsperson	appears	to	have	ensured	the	regional	judges	as	to	her	impartiality	and	to	the
efficiency	of	the	de-listing	procedure	(Joined	Cases	C‑584/10	P,	C‑593/10	P	and	C‑595/10	P	European	Commission,	Council	of	the
European	Union,	United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	v	Yassin	Abdullah	Kadi	(Opinion	of	Advocate	General	Bot)	[2013]
paras	81–4).
D.		A	Variety	of	Sanctions?
55		The	question	arises	whether	decisions	taken	by	international	organs	other	than	the	UN	Security	Council	imposing	measures	restricting
the	rights	of	third	States	or	entities,	can	qualify	as	sanctions,	on	the	ground	that	they	are	collective	measures	or	even	whether	a	single	State
can	resort	to	sanctions	in	order	to	have	the	international	legal	order	respected	by	a	wrongdoer.	Such	measures—which	have	become	quite
current—share	with	countermeasures	their	unilateral	character	and	have	been	assimilated	to	them	(see	Sicilianos	[2004]	19);	but	they	borrow
from	sanctions	the	characteristics	of	being	a	form	of	law	enforcement	in	the	absence	of	any	direct	injury	suffered	by	the	sanctioning	entity.
The	very	diverse	terminology	used	to	designate	them	bears	witness	of	this	uncertainty	(Dawidowicz	counts	not	less	than	eight	different
denominations:	‘collective	countermeasures;	third-party	countermeasures;	third-State	countermeasures;	countermeasures	of	general
interest;	multilateral	sanctions;	multilateral	countermeasures;	solidarity	measures	and	countermeasures	omnium’–at	333).
56		This	ambiguity	is	reflected	in	Art.	54	ILC	Articles	according	to	which:
Measures	taken	by	States	other	than	an	injured	State
This	chapter	[II	of	Part	III,	on	Counter-Measures]	does	not	prejudice	the	right	of	any	State,	entitled	under	article	48,	paragraph	1	to
invoke	the	responsibility	of	another	State,	to	take	lawful	measures	against	that	State	to	ensure	cessation	of	the	breach	and
reparation	in	the	interest	of	the	injured	State	or	of	the	beneficiaries	of	the	obligation	breached.
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57		As	noted	by	the	ILC	in	the	commentary	of	this	important	and	ambiguous	provision	which	has	been	compared	to	‘the	oracle	at	Delphi’
(Sicilianos	[2010]	1144),	‘[t]he	Article	speaks	of	‘lawful	measures’	rather	than	‘countermeasures’	so	as	not	to	prejudice	any	position
concerning	measures	taken	by	States	other	than	the	injured	State	in	response	to	breaches	of	obligations	for	the	protection	of	the	collective
interest	or	those	owed	to	the	international	community	as	a	whole’	(ILC	Articles,	Commentary	139,	para.	7).
58		In	spite	of	this	hesitation,	the	practice	of	such	‘measures’—which	have	much	in	common	with	sanctions	in	the	strict	meaning	of	the	word,
with	the	exception	of	their	institutionalized	and	centralized	character—is	increasing.	And	the	explanation	given	by	the	ILC	according	to	which
‘[p]ractice	on	this	subject	is	limited	and	rather	embryonic’	(ILC	Articles,	Commentary	137,	para.	3)	is	hardly	convincing:	the	Commission
itself	lists	several	examples	which	tend	to	show	that,	to	the	contrary,	States	(and	some	international	organizations)	are	more	and	more
inclined	to	resort	to	such	means	of	enforcement	as	→	erga	omnes	obligations	in	cases	of	serious	violations.	In	a	successful	synthesis,
Dawidowicz	(2007)	has	convincingly	established	that	these	kinds	of	sanctions	emanated	from	States	on	all	continents	(with	the	exception	of
Latin	America)	and	from	international	organizations	(see	eg	the	European	Communities	sanctions	against	Greece	[1970],	Yugoslavia	[1991],
Myanmar	[1997],	and	Zimbabwe	[2002],	or	the	sanctions	decided	by	the	Organisation	of	African	Unity	[‘OAU’]	against	Portugal	[1963]	and
Israel	[1993],	or	by	the	Economic	Community	of	West	African	States	[‘ECOWAS’]	against	Liberia	[1980])	decided	independently	and
sometimes	in	addition	of	UN	sanctions.
59		This	trend	is	in	line	with	the	new,	‘post-Ago’	approach	commonly	accepted	nowadays	which	rests	on	the	elimination	of	the	damage	from
the	very	definition	of	the	international	responsibility	and	the	postulate	that	respect	of	certain	fundamental	obligations	is	due	not	to	a	particular
State	(or	other	individualized	subject	of	international	law)	but	to	the	international	community	as	a	whole	(see	Pellet	[1996]	7–32).	As	long	as
international	law	was	seen	as	a	bundle	of	bilateral	reciprocal	obligations	it	was	logical	to	stick	to	the	Vatellian	principle	according	to	which
‘selon	le	Droit	des	Gens,	les	représailles	ne	peuvent	être	accordées	que	pour	maintenir	les	Droits	des	sujets	de	l’état,	&	non	pour	une	affaire
à	laquelle	la	Nation	n’a	aucun	intérêt’	[‘according	to	ius	gentium,	reprisals	can	be	accepted	only	with	the	view	to	maintain	the	Rights	of	the
subjects	of	the	State	and	not	for	an	issue	about	which	the	Nation	has	no	interest’]	(de	Vattel	Droit	des	gens	[1758]	Book	II	para.	348).
However,	a	new	conscience	has	emerged	that	some	rules	have	a	superior	value	and	impose	peremptory	obligations	erga	omnes	(see	ICJ
Barcelona	Traction,	Light	and	Power	Company,	Limited	32,	para	33:	‘an	essential	distinction	should	be	drawn	between	the	obligations	of	a
State	towards	the	international	community	as	a	whole,	and	those	arising	vis-à-vis	another	State	in	the	field	of	→	diplomatic	protection.	By
their	very	nature	the	former	are	the	concern	of	all	States.	In	view	of	the	importance	of	the	rights	involved,	all	States	can	be	held	to	have	a
legal	interest	in	their	protection;	they	are	obligations	erga	omnes’).	At	this	point	the	Grotian	view	resurfaces	where	‘kings	have	the	right	to
demand	punishment	not	only	on	account	of	injuries	committed	against	themselves	or	their	subjects,	but	also	on	account	of	injuries	which	do
not	directly	affect	them	but	excessively	violate	the	law	of	nature	or	of	nations	in	regard	to	any	persons	whatsoever’	(Grotius	De	iure	belli	ac
pacis	[1646]	Book	II	Chapter	20	para.	40).
60		The	main	issue	here	is	to	find	a	fair	balance	‘between	the	need	for	a	more	effective	legal	order	in	spite	of	decentralization,	and	the	risks
of	abuse	relating	to	the	allocation	of	enforcement	authority	to	individual	States,	even	if	limited	to	the	most	serious	illegalities’	(Dawidowicz
347).	Such	a	balance	is	still	to	be	found	and	this	might	vindicate	the	caution	shown	by	the	ILC	when	it	adopted	Art.	54.
61		There	can	be	no	doubt	that	there	is	a	marked	discrepancy	between	the	very	idea	of	sanctions	on	the	one	hand	and	the	traditional
international	legal	system	which	was	characterized	by	its	fundamental	decentralization	and	the	absence	of	any	authority	over	the	juxtaposed
sovereign	States.	The	simple	fact	that	sanctions	can	be	imposed	by	international	institutions	and,	in	some	cases,	by	individual	States	or
regional	organizations,	acting	in	the	name	of	the	international	community,	shows	that	this	long-established	analysis	of	international	law	is	no
longer	tenable—even	though	it	still	accurately	describes	essential	aspects	of	it,	as	shown	by	the	survival	of	counter-measures	as	a	valid
means	to	react	to	internationally	wrongful	acts.	The	existence	of	sanctions	bears	witness	to	the	slow	establishment	of	the	concept	of
community	within	the	international	legal	order,	in	line	with	institutions	like	ius	cogens	or	international	crimes––whether	committed	by	States,
in	which	case	the	2001	ILC	Articles	on	State	Responsibility	speak	of	‘a	serious	breach	by	State	of	an	obligation	arising	under	a	peremptory
norm	of	general	international	law’	(Art.	40),	or	by	individuals.
E.	The	Nature	of	Autonomous	Sanctions
62		In	legal	jargon	the	term	‘sanctions’	is	equally	used	to	designate	restrictive	measures	that	an	individual	State	or	international	organization
(like	the	EU:	a	list	of	EU	legislation	on	restrictive	measures	can	be	found	at	<http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm>	[24	August
2013])	chooses	to	take	against	another	State	or	organisation,	on	an	autonomous	basis,	as	opposed	to	measures	it	is	obliged	to	take	by	virtue
of	a	UNSC	resolution.	Quite	often	they	are	designated	as	‘autonomous	sanctions’	(Pellet	[2012]	436–40;	Portela	[2010]	48–9).
63	In	practice,	the	‘autonomous	sanctions’	have	been	taken	either	in	complement	of	Security	Council	mandated	measures,	or	against	a
State	subject	to	a	regime	of	sanctions	under	Chapter	VII	United	Nations	Charter.	For	instance,	the	EU	restrictive	measures	against	Iran	are
twofold:	on	the	one	side,	the	EU	is	implementing	the	UNSC	regime	(see	paras	19	and	37	above),	on	the	other	side,	it	supplements	this	regime
by	a	series	of	measures	that	go	beyond—ratione	materiae	and	ratione	personae—what	is	required	by	the	SC	resolutions.	The	second
typology	is	when	the	UNSC	members	cannot	agree	on	the	imposition	of	sanctions.	The	‘autonomous	sanctions’	are	then	a	surrogate	for
UNSC	sanctions:	the	measures	taken	against	Myanmar	and	Syria,	for	instance,	by	the	EU	(Council	Regulation	[EC]	194/2008	of	10	March
2008	on	Renewing	and	Strengthening	the	Restrictive	Measures	in	respect	of	Burma/Myanmar	and	Repealing	Regulation	[EC]	No	817/2006
[2008]	OJ	L	66,	1	and	Council	Regulation	[EC]	36/2012	of	19	January	2012	on	Restrictive	Measures	in	View	of	the	Situation	in	Syria	and
Repealing	Regulation	[EU]	No	442/2011	[2012]	OJ	L	16/1	respectively)	but	also	by	the	United	States	(Executive	Order	13047	of	20	May	1997
on	Prohibiting	New	Investment	in	Burma	and	Executive	Order	13582	of	18	August	2011	on	Blocking	Property	of	the	Government	of	Syria	and
Prohibiting	Certain	Transactions	with	Respect	to	Syria	respectively)	and	Australia	(where	the	autonomous	restrictive	measures	are	imposed
by	means	of	amendment	to	a	general	act,	either	the	Autonomous	Sanctions	Regulations	2011	or	the	Customs	[Prohibited	Exports]
Regulations	1958;	the	sanctions	against	Myanmar	were	imposed	on	24	October	2007;	the	sanctions	against	Syria,	on	13	May	2011)	are
examples	of	these	surrogate	sanctions.
64	Either	complementary	to	or	substitutive	of	the	UNSC	action,	the	nature	of	these	restrictive	measures	is	open	to	debate.	The	question
arises	whether	they	fall	into	the	strict	legal	definition	of	‘sanctions’.	According	to	the	strict	definition	of	sanctions,	lies	the	existence	of	an
‘organ	competent	first,	to	objectively	establish	the	violation	of	a	legal	rule,	and	second	to	impose	the	coercive	measures	meant	to	constrain
the	targeted	entity	to	restore	the	legality’	(para.	9	above).	It	is	apparent	that,	in	the	case	of	the	‘autonomous	sanctions’	both	conditions	are
lacking:	a	regional	international	organization	lacks	any	mandate	from	the	international	society	to	ascertain	the	violation	of	the	international
legality	and	to	restore	it	vis-à-vis	a	State	which	is	not	a	member	of	it.	Even	if	the	treaty	creating	that	organization	provides	for	a	legal	basis
(eg	Art.	215	TFEU),	it	is	nonetheless	res	inter	aliosacta	for	the	third	State	targeted	by	the	punitive	measure.	Moreover,	it	is	not	always	clear
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whether	the	aim	of	these	measures	is	to	restore	the	legality	or	to	simply	function	as	a	tool	of	foreign	policy,	even	though	in	practice	they	are
taken	in	response	to	situations	of	international	concern.
65		These	measures,	whether	taken	by	an	individual	State	or	a	regional	organization,	better	qualify	as	measures	of	→	retorsion	or	as
countermeasures,	the	distinctive	feature	being	whether	or	not	the	punitive	measures	in	question	are	taken	as	a	response	to	an	internationally
wrongful	act	or	not.	Whereas	the	countermeasures	are	by	definition	a	proportionate	response	to	such	an	internationally	wrongful	act,	the
measures	of	retorsion,	being	internationally	lawful	acts,	are	not	conditioned	by	the	existence	of	a	previous	wrongful	act;	but	they	themselves
must	respect	the	law	in	force.
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